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 Hannah Arendt’s notion of public space is one of her most fruitful, yet frustrating 
concepts.  Broadly speaking, public space is the space where individuals see and are seen 
by others as they engage in public affairs.  It is, thus, the space of the town hall meeting, 
the legislative assembly or any of the other venues where public business is done. What 
makes this concept so fruitful is that it gives us a way to phenomenologically analyze 
political freedom.  Such freedom, as Arendt points out, requires public space since it is 
“manifested only in certain … activities,” namely, those “that could appear and be real 
only when others saw them, judged them, remembered them.”  Thus, for the ancients, “the 
life of a free man needed the presence of others.  Freedom itself needed, therefore, a place 
where people could come together—the agora, the market-place, or the polis, the political 
space proper” (OR, 31).i  This need points to the fact that the being of political freedom 
depends on its appearing.  As Arendt writes, such freedom consists of “deeds and words 
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which are meant to appear, whose very existence hinges on appearance” (OR, 92).  Given 
this, a fruitful way to study political freedom is through the study of such appearing.  The 
freedom whose existence depends on appearing is, by definition, a subject of 
phenomenological inquiry.ii
 The frustration comes in when we apply Arendt’s insights to our present political 
situation.  Here, the result is almost entirely negative since Arendt claims that public space 
and its corresponding freedom have largely disappeared from the modern world.  This is 
because of their tie to “action,” that is, to the public activity of conducting public affairs.  
Arendt sharply distinguishes this action, which consists in “acting and speaking together,” 
from “labor” and “work” (HC, p. 198).
   
iii  The domination of modern society by the latter 
leads to the atrophy and near disappearance of both public space and political freedom.  
“Labor,” which she takes as essentially private, has no place for public space, replacing it 
with the workplace of the factory or office.  As for “work,” which is her term for 
fabrication, it reduces the public realm to the “the exchange market, where [the fabricator] 
can show the products of his hand,” this being, in today’s terms, the spaces of the market 
place and mall (HC, p. 160).  Lacking a proper public realm, political freedom, whose 
“actual content … is participation in public affairs, or administration of the public realm,” 
becomes, itself, unavailable (OR, 32).  It is replaced by a series of negative liberties that 
are “meant to institute permanent restraining controls upon all political power” (OR, 108).  
Freedom, in other words, comes to mean freedom from (rather than participation in) 
political power.   In Arendt’s terms, genuine political freedom becomes the “lost treasure” 
of “the revolutionary tradition” (OR, 215). 
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 In what follows, I am going to argue that this pessimistic assessment follows from 
Arendt’s exclusion of labor and work from the public realm.  Against Arendt’s claim that 
such activities are essentially private, I shall argue that they, like action, manifest our 
embodied being-in-the-world.  Arendt fails to see this because she consciously adopts the 
ancient prejudice against embodiment.  Once we do take account of our embodiment, 
however, we have a way of phenomenologically analyzing the public space that includes 
all the elements that Arendt saw as making up our human condition.    
§1. Arendt’s Critique of Embodiment 
 As Arendt observes, the traditional “contempt for labor” (HC, 81) was for the 
“slavish nature of all occupations that served the needs for the maintenance of life” (HC, 
83).  Essentially, it was contempt for our animality.  According to Arendt, for the an-
cients, “[w]hat men share with all other forms of animal life was not considered to be 
human.”  In fact, the condition of slavery “carried with it a metamorphosis of man into 
something akin to a tame animal” (HC, 84).  Arendt’s adoption of this view is signified 
by her remarking “that the use of the term ‘animal’ in the concept of animal laborans … 
is fully justified.  The animal laborans is indeed only one, at best the highest, of the ani-
mal species which populate the earth” (ibid.).  Behind this contempt was the notion of 
man as an animal possessing the ability to speak and, through this, the ability to construct 
a common, public world with his interlocutors.  The laboring condition, however, reduces 
us to the privacy of the body.  Labor accomplishes its action, not through speech, but 
through bodily exertion.  Now, as Arendt observes, “Nothing … is more private than the 
bodily functions of the life process” (HC, 111).  No one can eat for you, sleep for you or 
perform a host of other organic functions for you.  This very privacy makes the laborer to 
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be “worldless.”  In her words: “The animal laborans does not flee the world but is eject-
ed from it insofar as he is imprisoned in the privacy of his own body, caught in the ful-
fillment of need in which nobody can share and which nobody can fully communicate”  
(HC, 118-19).  Because of this, the laborer is “incapable of building or inhabiting a pub-
lic, worldly realm” (HC, 160). 
 A parallel critique is made of “work,” or fabrication, “which adds new objects to 
the human artifice” (HC, 88).  Such objects, such as clothing, furniture, etc., do create a 
“sheltering world.”  Those who produce them leave their workplaces to exchange them.  
They meet and have a public realm, “the exchange market.”  This realm, however, is in-
fected by the privacy of the body.  For John Locke, “the privacy of appropriation” 
through labor makes its products the property of the laborer.  According to Arendt, this 
argument receives its plausibility from the privacy of “the bodily functions of the life 
process.”iv
 For Arendt, the only mode of entrance to the common world occurs through “ac-
tion,” which consists of “speech as a means of persuasion.”  “To be political, to live in a 
polis,” she writes, “meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and 
not through force” (HC, 26).  In fact, “Aristotle’s definition of man as a zöon politikon [a 
political animal] … can be fully understood only if one adds his second famous definition 
of man as a zöon logon ekhon [‘a living being capable of speech’]” (HC, 27).  This is be-
  It is, in other words, the privacy of the laboring body that makes the products 
that the workman produces into private property.  The public realm, in which such prop-
erty is exchanged, thus mediates the privacy of the workplace and that of the private 
places, the homes, where they are used.  Such products, in other words, are not common 
but owned. 
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cause to be political is to engage in “a way of life in which speech and only speech made 
sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each other” (ibid.).  
The result of such talk is the presence of public space.  This is “the space where I appear 
to others as others appear to me,” that is, “the space where men … make their appearance 
explicitly”  (HC, 198-99).  “Most men …” she adds, “—the slave … the laborer or 
craftsman … the jobholder or businessmen in our world—do not live in it.”  The fact that 
they do not means that they are “deprived of reality, which humanly and politically 
speaking, is the same as appearance.”  Her point is that “the reality of the world is guar-
anteed by others, by its appearing to us all” (HC, 199).  Since we cannot see through one 
another’s eyes, the only way we can grasp the world that appears to us all is through the 
discourse that links us to others.  We report what we experience and take it to be real 
when our reports are confirmed by others.  In excluding labor and work from such con-
firmatory discourse, she thus deprives their practitioners of the full human reality of what 
appears.  At the basis of this exclusion is the embodied nature of their activities.  The 
body they employ imposes a privacy that is incapable of such discourse. 
§2. Embodiment and Appearing 
 Arendt writes that “action and speech create a space between the participants 
which can find its proper location almost anytime and anywhere” (HC, 198).  As such, 
this space, like the words that create it, has a disembodied character.  Unlike labor and 
work, which are performed, not for themselves, but for what they accomplish or produce, 
action’s goal is its own continuance.  The free discussion that opens up public space has 
as its goal the maintenance of such space through its own appearing.  Thus, as Arendt 
writes, in political life, the ‘product’ is identical with the performing act itself.”  In this it 
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is like “the performance of the dancer” (HC, 207).  On the one hand, we cannot tell the 
dancer from the dance.  On the other, the point of dancing (the ‘product’ it produces) is 
the dance itself.  Thus, both the dance and the dancer are simultaneously actualized. 
This example betrays the difficulty hidden in her account: Dancing is the 
movement of the body.  To dance, one must be embodied.  The same holds for speaking.  
To speak is to give voice, which involves the breath and the voice box.  The speaker, 
moreover, must be clothed and fed by the workman and the laborer.  Furthermore, since 
the speakers are embodied, they need “a place where people [can] come together—the 
agora, the market-place, or the polis,” all of which, presumably, need to be constructed.  
None of these constraints, which involve the necessities of labor and work, would be 
present for disembodied speakers.  Speech, in fact, is necessary to overcome the physical 
divide between speakers that embodiment brings.  For disembodied beings, this necessity 
would fall away.  Like angelic intelligences, they would know immediately one another’s 
minds.  Given this, the appearing that speech makes possible presupposes embodiment.  It 
points, in fact, to the ways in which embodiment and appearing, in particular the appearing 
of public space, imply each other.   
At the root of this implication is the fact that the body is much more than the 
private sphere of its organic needs.  It is also the ability—the “I can”—to fulfill them.  This 
“I can,” in fulfilling these needs, also discloses the world.  Doing so it intertwines the self 
with the world, making the self, in its “I can,” part of the appearing world.  To see this, we 
have to trace a few of the levels in which our “I can” both situates the appearing world 
“in” us as a place of disclosure and situates us “in” this disclosed world.  The most basic 
level of this situating “I can” is that of the “I can sensuously perceive something.”  As 
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Merleau-Ponty writes in describing this level, when I see an object, I believe that “my 
vision terminates in it, that it holds and stops my gaze with its insurmountable density.”  
The object is out there in the world, a world that includes me as one of the visible objects.  
“Yet,” he adds, “as soon as I attend to it, this conviction is just as strongly contested by the 
very fact that this vision is mine” (VI, pp. 4-5). v
Behind this belief is the fact of my being an embodied perceiver.  In my bodily 
being, I provide the venues for the world’s appearing.  Using the word tapisser, to cover, 
drape, line or wallpaper, Merleau-Ponty expresses this by asserting, “our flesh lines and 
even envelops all the visible and tangible things” (VI, p. 123).   Thus, we “line” the world 
with visual qualities through our eyes, with tactile qualities through our sensitive skin, and 
so on.  Doing so, our embodied being provides measures “for being, dimensions to which 
we can refer it” (VI, p. 103).  In other words, through our flesh, we can refer to the sensible 
aspects of being.  We can measure it along the axes or dimensions of its colors, tastes, 
sounds, smells, roughness and smoothness (ibid.).  The world that is present through our 
embodiment is, however, the very world that our embodiment, as something that appears, 
thrusts us into.  This means, Merleau-Ponty writes, “my eyes which see, my hands which 
touch, can also be seen and touched … they see and touch the visible, the tangible from 
within” the visible and tangible world (VI, p. 123).  Similarly, the flesh that “lines and even 
envelops” the things of this world is “nevertheless surrounded” by them (ibid.). 
 I believe that my perception “is formed 
this side of the body”—my body.  Thus, I close my eyes and the world disappears.  I open 
them and it is again visually present along with my body.  Holding “on to both ends of the 
chain,” I assert “I am in the world and the world is in me” (VI, p. 8).   
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 Our body does not just “line” the world through its senses.  The “I can” of its 
bodily mobility also provides a space for the world’s disclosure.  As Merleau-Ponty writes, 
“it is literally the same thing to perceive one single marble and to use two fingers as one 
single organ.”vi
The same point holds when we proceed up another level and expand this “I can” to 
include our projects.  The disclosure of the world’s senses is not simply a matter of 
beholding and manipulating objects.  It arises from the practical projects such abilities 
make possible.  Thus, as we employ various objects for our projects, we get the sense of 
what they are for.  Their pragmatic meanings are given by their purposes.  A hammer, for 
example, is understood when we use it to drive in a nail; a glass reveals its sense when we 
use it to drink from.  Engaging in such projects, we are both in the world and disclosive of 
it.  Here, the place of such disclosure is our purposeful activity.  As embodied, such 
activity is in the world.  The world, however, is also within this activity since the activity is 
what “lines” the world by providing us with a new set of dimensions for its appearing.  The 
same intertwining characterizes the senses that our projects disclose.  They, too, are within 
us and external to us.  They are within us since they guide our actions as we employ 
various objects for particular purposes.  Yet our action externalizes them.  When we use a 
hammer to drive in a nail, the pragmatic meanings we assign to these objects are apparent 
  Our perception of the marble is one with a set of bodily acts, those of 
reaching over, picking up and handling the marble.  It is by rolling it between our fingers 
that we perceive its different colors and determine its hardness and smoothness.  Such 
activities are part of the ways in which we “line” the world.  They form part of the “place” 
of the disclosure of the world.  As part of our bodily “I can,” this “place” is within us and 
also within the world.  
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to others.  The body-project that discloses these senses thrusts them into the public realm.  
They become senses inherent in a project that is there for others to observe. 
 Projects, of course, are not just individual but also collective.  As we grow up, the 
“I can” of our initial projects becomes expanded to an “I can” that functions with the “I 
can” of others as we engage in various activities.  Such collective projects are correlated to 
the ways we disclose the world, i.e., “line” it by providing a new set of dimensions for its 
appearing. This appearing includes our own appearing as the accomplishers of these 
collective projects.  Thus, the “I can” play the violin as a member of a string-quartet 
discloses me as a member of this ensemble.  It is, correspondingly, also the disclosure of a 
world, that of the music written for the players, that can only exist as a correlate of our 
activity.  Similarly, the member of an aboriginal hunting party discloses the world of the 
hunt as well as himself as a participant in it.   
 As we pass through these levels of the “I can,” the sense of the body that engages 
in projects extends its sense.  The “I can” that defines its activity includes the implements 
it uses—the glass for drinking, the hammer that drives the nail, etc.  Its functioning, in 
other words, is in terms of the senses it discloses.  As such, it is situated and historical.  
The “I can” that includes talking on the telephone extends the voice to speak over great 
distances.  That which includes driving a car extends the “I can” of its mobility.  The same 
holds for the internet, the smart phones and social media that were involved in the actions 
of the “Arab Spring.”  The collective projects and disclosures of collective worlds that 
these made possible would not have been possible a dozen years ago.vii  Such media also 
have to be included among the ways that we “line” the world, providing ways for the world 
and ourselves to appear. 
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 For Arendt, as we have seen, appearing is primarily tied to language.  It is what 
creates the public space between individuals—in her words, “the space where I appear to 
others as others appear to me,” that is, “the space where men … make their appearance 
explicitly”  (HC, 198-99).  “Most men” as we cited her, “do not live in it.”  The embodied 
nature of their activities prevents this.  This opposition of language to embodiment forgets 
the role of the body in our learning a language.  Such learning occurs in the context of our 
initial body-projects.  For example, we first learned the word “spoon” when our caregivers, 
speaking to us, taught how to use a spoon to eat.  Its meaning was given by its function, 
and its function was set by the particular projects that our caregivers and companions 
introduced us to.  As is obvious, the more multiple the projects an object is involved in, the 
more multiple are its meanings.  Thus, besides meaning something to eat with, a spoon can 
also mean something to ladle sugar with, to measure with, to stir with, and, for children, 
something to dig in the garden with.  Each new use discloses a new aspect of it and adds to 
what comes to mind in connection with the word.   
This same holds generally.  The basic senses that make up our language come from 
the projects that disclose the world.  The commonness of our projects, for example, our 
common use of the spoon to eat with, gives us the commonness of our senses.  Such 
commonness is verified each time we engage in our collective projects, i.e., coordinate our 
activities to achieve a common end.  Such projects disclose a common world, one 
constituted by the senses we share.  Given this, Arendt’s assertion that the “the reality of 
the world is guaranteed by others, by its appearing to us all” does not point to the 
distinction between embodiment and language.  On the contrary, this common appearing 
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indicates the commonality of our embodiment, i.e., the commonality of the organic and the 
technologically extended “I can” of our common projects. 
§3. Embodied Public Space 
 As the above analysis indicates, appearing has to be thought in terms of embodi-
ment.  The body is not private—i.e., worldless.  It is what thrusts us into the world.  It 
makes our being-in-the-world a place of the world’s disclosure.  The point can be put in 
terms of incarnation—of becoming flesh.  The appearing world incarnates itself through 
our perceptual organs.  It achieves its embodied, sensuous presence through their lining the 
world.  By virtue of them, it has its weight, its texture, its sounds, colors and smells.  These 
same organs also line our own bodily presence.  We appear in this embodied world as em-
bodied perceivers.  The same point can be made with regard to all the other ways that we 
line the world through our projects and our language.  They make the world appear as 
filled with pragmatic and linguistic senses.  They make us appear within it as pragmatic 
and speaking agents. 
Our intertwining with the world we appear in means that neither side can be 
thought apart from the other.  Thus, we cannot speak of the sensuous world apart from our 
perceptual experience, an experience that presupposes our own existence as embodied per-
ceivers.  As embodied, we provide the place for its disclosure.  Contrariwise, we cannot 
think of our existence as embodied perceivers apart from the sensuous world.  This world 
is our place of disclosure.  Appearing within it, our bodies can be examined and disclosed 
along with all other appearing objects.  The same pattern of reciprocal disclosure holds for 
all the other levels of our embodied “I can.”  The world of the aboriginal hunting party, for 
example, is inexplicable apart from the activities that disclose it.  Such activities, however, 
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draw their sense from this world.  Similarly, we cannot grasp the functioning of language 
apart from the world with the objects and activities that language names and describes.  
Such objects and activities, however, have their intersubjective presence only through lan-
guage.  They appear as common only by virtue of our expressing to each other what we 
perceive.   
 In our concrete, human reality, all of the levels of the “I can” are intertwined with 
each other.  This means that not only do they disclose the world by embodying it along a 
particular sets of dimensions, they also embody and, hence, disclose one another.  Thus, 
the sensuously present senses of the “I can perceive” are required for the pragmatic senses 
that our individual projects disclose, which themselves are required for the senses that our 
collective projects make apparent.  The functioning of our language is tied to such senses 
and is, in fact, what makes them genuinely intersubjective.  Genetically regarded, there is, 
here, an order of precedence.  We must first perceive before we can manipulate perceiva-
ble objects.  We have to be able to manipulate them to engage in our projects, and so on.  
Once established, however, all the levels are intertwined.  The sensuous objects we now 
see are immediately taken as intersubjectively present.  They appear to us bathed in lan-
guage.  Their linguistic and sensuous presence is intertwined. 
 The same pattern holds when we turn to Arendt’s trinity of labor, work, and action.  
To view them in terms of embodiment is to understand them in terms of the “I can.”  So 
regarded, they are three ways in which we disclose the world, three ways in which we con-
struct the public space that we inhabit.  Such public space can only be understood in terms 
of their intertwining.  Each of them embodies the others.  Doing so, they serve as places of 
disclosure for each other—i.e., as the places for their reciprocal appearing.  This appearing 
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occurs in conjunction with our disclosure of the world.  We disclose the world even as we 
disclose the elements of our human condition.  The public space we share is, in fact, the 
result of such disclosure. 
 Since all these elements are part of our human condition, the disclosure of each 
can be seen as calling the others into question.  It points out the one-sidedness of their 
accounts of our condition.  Thus, the one-sidedness of labor comes from the fact “that,” 
as Arendt writes, “it leaves nothing behind, that the result of its effort is almost as quickly 
consumed as the effort is spent” (HC, 87).  Work, with its focus on products that outlast 
the laboring process calls this perspective into question.  It points out that the very transi-
ence that marks it means that the laboring process leaves no lasting, sheltering world be-
hind.  Work, however, also has its one-sidedness.   It fails to realize that the world it cre-
ates only lasts through being maintained and repaired by labor.  As for action, its one-
sidedness springs from its disdain for embodiment and, hence, for labor and work.  In 
classical Athens, for example, craftsmen were treated with aristocratic contempt, while 
labor was degraded to the point of slavery. This separation of action from making and 
labor deprives societies of the permanence and organic vitality necessary for their contin-
uance.  At the extreme, it pits the few who have the leisure to engage in political life 
against the many that are excluded.  The strikes and disruptions this result in can be un-
derstood as labor and work attempting to disclose its one-sidedness.   
To overcome this, we have to open up public space.  All the elements of our con-
dition must participate in the discourse that creates this space.  By pointing out their own 
contributions to it, they must be free to call one another into question.  A well-
functioning public space vibrates with different accounts.  It involves the continuous dia-
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logue between them.  Such public space is not a “lost treasure” of “the revolutionary tra-
dition.”  It is not the case as Arendt writes, that “[t]he relationship between a ruling elite 
and the people, between the few, who among themselves constitute a public space, and 
the many, who spend their lives outside it and in obscurity, has remained unchanged” 
(OR, 277).  When conceived in terms of embodiment, such space includes the historical 
development of our “I can.”  In our day, this involves its extension through smart phones, 
uploading videos and the world-wide reach of the internet.  This extension of public 
space points to the democratization of “action” in the most fundamental of the senses that 
Arendt assigns to it—that of showing who and what those who engage in action are.  It 
shows that public space is not static, but rather a continuing gift of our embodied ability 
to disclose.   
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